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Abstract
The goal of this paper is to examine the impact of macroeconomic and financial 
determinants of the shadow banking dynamics in the selected 11 new EU member 
states using yearly data from 1999-2018. We apply three methods: fixed effects 
model, the difference-GMM and the system-GMM (Generalized Method of 
Moments). Empirical results provide evidence that the most important factors are 
the developments in the financial sectors (insurance and pension sectors), banking 
sector, money market rate, as well as the general economic growth. We also found 
that global financial crisis has a negative impact on the shadow banking growth. 
From the results we may conclude that traditional banks, insurance sector and 
pension funds are complementary with shadow banking. This results was opening 
new issues for macroprudential policy, bearing in mind the Basel III norms. 
Namely, one of the main goals of Basel 3 is to reduce procyclicality of bank 
lending, and the rise of shadow banking may have an impact on both capital-based 
regulation and income-based limits.
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1. Introduction
Shadow bank financing is a valuable alternative to bank financing for many firms 
and households, fostering competition in the supply of financing and supporting 
economic activity. Hence, it can constitute a useful part of the financial system 
(Pozsar, 2010; FSB, 2011; EC, 2012). However, shadow bank financing may also 
become a source of systemic risk, both directly and through its interconnectedness 
with the conventional banking system, if it involves activities that are typically 
performed by banks, such as maturity/liquidity transformation and creation of 
leverage (FSB, 2019). 
While this is a remarkably interesting topic, there have not been many studies 
that provide empirical evidence on the determinants of shadow banking. The 
explanations vary from lack of statistical data on shadow banking to the ambiguity 
of its definition (IMF, 2014). Namely, the Financial Stability Board (FSB, 2011) 
offers two definitions of the shadow banking system. The broad definition is that 
it encompasses “credit intermediation involving entities and activities outside 
the regular banking system”, whereas the narrow definition refers to “a system 
of credit intermediation that involves entities and activities outside the regular 
banking system, and raises (1) systemic risk concerns, in particular by maturity/
liquidity transformation, leverage and flawed credit risk transfer, and/or (2) 
regulatory arbitrage concern.” Wesley (2014: 317) defines the shadow banks as 
“private financial entities that create ex-nihilo credit-money without deposits”. 
More specifically, Guttmann (2016) conceptualizes four pillars of shadow banking: 
money markets; repurchasing agreements; securitization; and over-the-counter 
derivatives (e.g., swaps and credit derivatives). Shadow banks are often less 
regulated than traditional banks, lack a formal safety net and typically receive 
indirect or implicit enhancements (e.g., Claessens and Ratnovski, 2014).
The shadow banking in European context has unique roots, as it occurs both outside 
and partially within the banking system. For instance, the European Economic 
and Social Committee (EESC, 2012) underlined [that] “there are many ways in 
which shadow banks replicate traditional banks, and some shadow banks are 
part of traditional banks.” Jeffers and Plihon (2014) trace back the blossoming of 
market-based financing (shadow banking) in Europe to the financialization and 
the extensive financial deregulation in 1980s. As opposed to the diverse non-bank 
financial intermediaries in the “old” EU member states, the main entities that form 
the shadow banking system in Central, Eastern and South-Eastern Europe are 
simple and easy to identify (Ghosh et al., 2012). 
Definitional ambiguities offer only a partial explanation for the scarce empirical 
literature. Most of the studies are still in an incipient or a working-paper stage, and 
mainly focus on the United States, the United Kingdom, or the euro area countries, 
while the new EU member states remain slightly neglected. These countries in the 
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past shared a socialist central planning system and to day they still invest significant 
efforts in order to establish a well-functioning financial system, thus depriving 
shadow banking of a context that could allow for its institutions and activities to 
flourish Du Li et al. (2017).
This paper therefore aims to fill an important gap in the literature and to empirically 
estimate how selected determinants will affect the dynamics of shadow banking 
sector in selected 11 new EU Member States. We provide a sector decomposition to 
better understand the underlying trends and tendencies. Furthermore, the panel data 
estimation techniques involve static and dynamic (General Method of Moments, 
GMM) models and explore the role of potential drivers of shadow banking, which 
are frequently discussed in the related literature. 
The basic hypothesis of this paper is that selected macroeconomic and financial 
factors have statistically significant impact on shadow banking growth.
Our article contributes to the advancement of the knowledge on shadow banking, 
by providing information on development and determinants in the 11 new EU 
Member States. We believe that a deeper understanding of the shadow banking 
determinants may help national policy makers to mitigate the related risks, while 
benefiting from the main advantages. 
The remainder of the article is organized as follows: Section 2 overviews some of 
the main empirical findings on the size, scope and determinants of shadow banking; 
Section 3 describe the data and methodology; and Section 4 presents the empirical 
results. Section 5 outlines the conclusions of the research.
2. Literature review
As already noted, most of the existing studies on shadow banking focus on the 
United States and to a lesser extent on Europe (e.g., Girasa, 2016; Nesvetailova, 
2018). Even though shadow banking extends well before the Global Financial 
Crisis (GFC), our focus is on the post-crisis research. The academic literature in 
European context has progressed along several strands: (1) examinations of the 
size and evolution of shadow banking (e.g., Maddaloni et al., 2011; Grillet-Aubert 
et al., 2016; Malatesta et al., 2016); (2) investigations of potential determinants 
behind the decade-long boom of the shadow banking system (e.g., Barbu et al., 
2016; Grillet-Aubert et al., 2016; Hodula, 2018; 2019; Apostoaie and Bilan, 2019); 
(3) assessments of the implications of shadow banking for systemic risk, financial 
stability, and growth (e.g., Lysandrou and Nesvetailova, 2015; Dumičić and Ridzak, 
2016; Langfield and Pagano, 2016); (4) analyses of jurisdictional competition, 
regulation and supervision of shadow banking (e.g., O’Sullivan and Kinsella, 
2012; 2013; Adrian, 2014). Given the main hypothesis, our literature review is 
Jordan Kjosevski, Mihail Petkovski, Aleksandar Stojkov • The impact of macroeconomic... 
410 Zb. rad. Ekon. fak. Rij. • 2020 • vol. 38 • no. 2 • 407-427
limited only to the first two strands of the empirical literature. Surprisingly, little 
empirical work has been done to analyze the relative importance of specific driving 
forces for the development of a shadow banking system, suggesting that obstacles 
or challenges to such research do exist. Another signal of the analytical gap in 
the literature on shadow banking in Europe is that many studies exist as working 
papers, rather than as published work in refereed journals.
Academic attempts for measuring shadow banking have encountered problems 
in defining its scope. Some authors adopted a broad definition, encompassing all 
non-monetary financial institutions, with exception of pension funds and insurance 
companies (Bakk and Simon et al., 2012; Apostoaie and Bilan, 2020). Other studies 
using higher frequency data apply a narrower definition in European context, 
by also excluding the money market funds, due to a lack of quarterly data (e.g., 
Apostoaie and Bilan, 2020). The implications can be sizable.
Due to the complexity of the phenomenon and data limitations, authors and 
institutions have either resorted to entity-based or activity-based measurement 
approaches. The entity-based approach to measuring shadow banking is based on 
aggregation of the financial assets of selected non-monetary financial intermediaries 
(e.g., Pozsar et al., 2013). Some authors use the gross value of financial assets (e.g. 
Apostoaie and Bilan, 2019), whereas others (e.g., Barbu et al., 2016) use the net 
value of total assets. The entity- or institution-based approach has drawbacks, as 
some intermediaries may not (fully) engage in shadow banking activities. For 
instance, the Financial Stability Board excludes financial activities with no direct 
relation to credit intermediation (e.g., equity investment funds) or activities that are 
already consolidated into banking groups (FSB, 2014; 2015; Agresti and Brence, 
2017). To remedy this definitional problem, other studies adopted an activity-based 
approach, focusing on financial instruments or markets (e.g., Gorton and Metrick, 
2012; Mehrling et al., 2013; Claessens and Ratnovski, 2014). For example, Botta et 
al., (2018) explain that shadow banking is based on three main activities (processes) 
connecting commercial banks and financial firms: (1) securitization of mortgages 
by commercial banks; (2) production and issuance by financial firms of structured 
financial products, and (3) provision by commercial banks of credit to financial 
firms through the repo market. Although methodologically sounder, to our best 
knowledge, the ‘pure’ activity-based approach has not been applied in the European 
case, because of data limitations.
The empirical literature has identified several hypotheses regarding the main 
driving forces of shadow banking: (1) the procyclicality and high liquidity 
hypotheses: overall macroeconomic and global liquidity factors; (2) the search 
for yield hypothesis: financial products offered outside the traditional banking 
system usually bring a higher yield; (3) the complementarity hypothesis: shadow 
banking grows together with the conventional banking system, as it can expand 
access to credit, enhance maturity transformation, and promote risk sharing; (4) 
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overcapitalization/substitution hypothesis: the high capital requirements, high funding 
costs and regulation burden in the traditional banking system contributes to the 
very phenomenon of shadow banking; (5) the institutional cash pool hypothesis: 
the demand from institutional investors contributes to the development of shadow 
banking. Given the limited number of empirical investigations of the determinants 
of shadow banking in European context, we present the main findings in these 
studies by associating them with the dominant hypotheses.
IMF (2014) analyzes the determinants of shadow banking in a set of 26 mostly 
developed economies, covering some European countries over the 1990-
2013 period. The study highlights that tightening bank capital requirements 
creates incentives for banks to shift their activities to the non-bank sector, hence 
positively influencing the growth of shadow banking. In addition, the size of the 
banking sector is positively correlated with the extent of shadow banking, thereby 
supporting the complementarity hypothesis. Furthermore, the results show that 
the relationship between institutional investors’ growth and shadow banking 
development is positive. The results of the study indicate a negative relationship 
between real short-term interest rates and shadow banking growth. 
Malatesta et al. (2016) estimated the determinants of shadow banking in the euro 
area countries over the period 1999Q1-2014Q.The results of their study show that 
as a main determinants of shadow banks are: the GDP growth, inflation, and the 
term spread). They also find evidence of a possible crowding-out effect, suggesting 
that the growth rate of loans from traditional banks is inversely related with the 
relative role of shadow banks.
The empirical literature does not offer an explicit support for the procyclicality 
hypothesis. Barbu et al. (2016) estimate the macroeconomic determinants of shadow 
banking for a panel of 15 EU member states (including four CEE economies) using 
quarterly data (2008Q1-2015Q3). As a proxy for shadow banking, they use the 
net value of total assets. On one hand the results of their paper shows that long-
term interest rates and stock index have positive impact of shadow banking, while 
on the other hand the shadow banking is negatively associated with GDP growth, 
development of investment funds, liquidity and short-term interest rates.
Furthermore, Hodula (2018) analyzed determinants of shadow banking growth 
using data of 24 EU countries for the period 2004-2017. The results show that 
the EU shadow banking system is positively correlated to more stringent capital 
regulation, increasing demand of long-term institutional investors, financial 
development and interest rates in the economy. Based on the results of the empirical 
model, the author concludes that the main determinants of shadow banking 
were different in the old and new EU member states, mainly due to the missing 
legal framework for securitization in the new members. Hodula (2019) provides 
empirical evidence that the tightening of monetary conditions negatively affected 
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the growth of traditional banking but strengthened the growth of shadow banking. 
This lends some support to the validity of the substitution hypothesis during 
monetary tightening.
Apostoaie and Bilan (2019) estimated the determinants of shadow banking 
dynamics in 11 EU member states from Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) over the 
period 2004-2017, using fixed-effects estimation and a quarterly data. They applied 
two dependent variables that correspond to two different measures of the shadow 
banking sector – the broad one (including all non-monetary financial institutions, 
except insurance corporations and pension funds) and the narrow one (excluding 
from the above one the investment funds other than money market funds). They 
used six macroeconomic and financial variables as independent determinants.
Country-specific empirical investigations of shadow banking also shed light on 
the driving forces, but these studies are even more scarce. Hodula et al. (2020) 
investigate the Czech shadow banking sector over the last decade and find evidence 
in favor of the procyclicality and complementarity hypotheses.
Despite the great interest in the topic, most studies refer to the developed countries, 
whereas emerging markets and developing economies are deprived of a more in-
depth investigation of this phenomenon. 
3. Methodology
In order to analyse the determinants that affected the shadow banking in the new 
EU Member States, we conducted a panel data analysis. We opted for this type 
of analysis as it provides several benefits (Hsiao, 2003): (1) the use of panel 
data enables us to control for individual heterogeneity; (2) panels provide more 
informative data, more variability, less collinearity among the variables, greater 
degree of freedom, and higher efficiency; (3) with panel data, one is better equipped 
to study the dynamics of adjustment; (4) panel data are more suitable for identifying 
and measuring effects that are simply not detectable in pure cross-sections or pure 
time-series data, and (5) panel data models allow for the construction of and testing 
more complicated behavioural models than pure cross-section or time data models. 
In order to provide consistent and unbiased results, we implemented three 
alternative estimation techniques. Our analysis we start with the assessment of 
fixed and random effects With the fixed- effects model, we assume that the units 
of interest (in our case, countries) are fixed, and that the differences between them 
are not of interest. On the other hand, with the random model, we assume that the 
units are a random sample extracted from a larger population. Accordingly, for our 
analysis of the 11 new EU Member States from Central, Eastern and South-Eastern 
Europe, the model of fixed effects will be adequate, since the data set covers all 
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11 new EU member states and the conclusions drawn from this analysis will only 
apply to them. In addition, we will also conduct the statistical test of Hausman 
(1978) for distinguishing between the models of fixed and random effects.
The specification (2) of the empirical model with fixed effect is as follows:
yit = xit β + τt + δi + εit (2)
i and t are the indices of countries and years, respectively; τt’s denote time effects 
to capture macroeconomic circumstances; δi’s are called unobserved country fixed 
effects; εit’s are all unobserved idiosyncratic errors (i.i.d); yit’s are the broad measure 
of shadow banking as a percent of GDP of country i in period t,xit’s contain control 
variables, and β is the coefficient vector that we are interested in. Thus, we estimate 
models with fixed effects estimator, allowing for the correlation between δi and xit. 
While the approach is rather simple and intuitive, this model is not suitable forour 
paper due to potential inertia of the dependent variable. Namely, the assets of OFI 
in our model can involve persistence in their movement, that is, its present value 
to a certain extent depends on its past value. Bearing this in mind, we are more 





= −∑ 1 ,  (3)
The dynamic model includes lagged dependent variables, yi,t−j. It also allows for the 
correlation between δi and xit (cov(δi, xit) ≠ 0). In order to capture the persistence 
of the assets of OFI and to eliminate the fixed effects (and their correlations), we 
difference the model and adopt the difference Generalized Method of Moments 
including the lagged difference of the dependent variable was introduced by 
Arellano and Bond (1991). We use the one-step generalized method of moments 
estimator (GMM) developed by Arellano-Bond (1991), because according to 
Judson and Owen (1999), his estimator outperforms the two-step estimator both in 





= −∑ 1 ,  (4)
In the differenced model (4), there still exists a correlation between lagged values 
of dependent variable Δyi,t−j and the differenced errors, Δεit. According to Nickell 
(1981), the standard fixed effects estimator is not consistent, because this correlation 
produces biased estimates. Bearing this in mind, we employ the system-GMM 
estimator based on Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998), 
which addresses the endogeneity problem caused by the correlation. 
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In order to avoid the problem of too many instruments in comparison to the number 
of groups (Roodman, 2009), the number of instruments are kept lower than the 
number of countries. In the standard (unconstrained) form, each instrumenting 
variable creates one instrument for each time period and the lag available to that 
period, whereas – in the collapsed form – a single column vector of instruments 
is created instead of a whole matrix of instruments. Although collapsing can 
reduce statistical efficiency in large samples, it can be very helpful as a tool in 
avoiding the bias in finite samples, which are usually characterized by instrument 
proliferation. In other words, we control the number of instruments by limiting our 
analysis to the second lag. This helps avoid any bias due to too many instruments 
in a relatively small sample. The validity of the parameter estimation instruments 
selected can be tested using the Hansen test. Furthermore, we will test serial 
correlations in the differenced residuals (first-order [AR1]) and second-order 
[AR2] serial correlations). According to Arellano and Bond (1991), the first-order 
autocorrelation in the differenced residuals does not imply that the estimates are 
inconsistent. However, the second-order autocorrelation would imply that this is the 
case.
According to all the above, the analysis in the next section will evaluate the 
economic model (1) through 3 panel methods: the method of fixed effects, the 
difference – GMM and the system-GMM methods. 
4. Empirical data and analysis
For the purposes of this research, we use an unbalanced panel of annual data for 
11 NMS from Central, Eastern and South-Eastern Europe (Bulgaria, Croatia, 
Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovak 
Republic and Slovenia) for the period 1999-2018. The sample selection is based 
on similarities in the level of economic and institutional development, historical 
legacies, geographical and cultural proximity, which greatly influences the creation 
of economic relations between these countries. The choice of time period in this 
paper was contingent upon the availability of time series data of all determinants 
included in the model, particularly of our dependent variable. According to Rinaldi 
and Sanchis-Arellano (2006), unbalanced panel data allow for more observations 
and their results are less dependent on a particular period. 
The determinants selected in our model are mostly used in the academic literature 
(Kim, 2016; Barbu et al., 2019; Apostoaie and Bilan, 2019). The data sources 
used for our model include Eurostat, other databases from credible international 
and European sources, IMF’s International Financial Statistics and Monetary and 
Financial Statistics database, ECB’s Statistical Data Warehouse database and World 
Bank data.
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The econometric model is depicted by equation (1):
SBit = βj DETj,i,t + ui,t (1)
where i refers to the country (i=1–11); t refers to time periods (years) (t=1–19); 
SB is the dependent variable; DETj is a vector of independent variables; βj are the 
coefficients of the explanatory variables, and ui,t are the idiosyncratic (observation-
specific) errors.
Before presenting the potential determinants of SB, it is necessary to identify the 
dependent variable. As mentioned in the literature review, there is no internationally 
harmonised definition that has been applied in all or most of the countries in the 
world for a considerable period of time. Bearing this in mind, we follow (Kim, 
2016) and Apostoaie and Bilan (2019) and as a measure of shadow banking, we use 
OFI (total assets of Other Financial Intermediaries, expressed in percent of GDP), 
as defined by the European Commission and Eurostat. This broad measure of 
shadow banking encompasses the asset size of OFI, which consists of the financial 
sector other than banks, pension funds and insurance companies, public financial 
institutions, and financial auxiliaries. One advantage of the OFI statistics is the high 
degree of international consistency, thus allowing for comparisons and aggregations 
across countries (e.g. Broos et al., 2012).
We employ the following explanatory variables:
– macroeconomic determinants: real GDP growth (gdpg); the three-month inter-
bank rate (short), and M2/GDP ratio (m2gdp);
– financial determinants: size of banks as a percent of GDP (bank); insurance as a 
percent of GDP (penetra); and pension funds as a percent of GDP (pens); 
– a dummy variable for the occurrence of the Global Financial Crisis 2007-08 
(crisis).
Within the core determinants of all previously mentioned studies, the variables related 
to Gross Domestic Product (GDP) are among the main macroeconomic determinants 
of shadow banking growth. In this context, several variations of this determinant, 
such as the annual growth rate of real GDP, the growth rate of income per capita, etc., 
are well known in the literature. However, the real GDP growth rate is by far the most 
common macroeconomic determinant, used for example in Duca (2016), Malatesta 
et al. (2016) and Hodula et al. (2017). For this determinant we expect a positive and 
significant impact of real GDP growth that is consistent with the shadow banking 
procyclicality hypothesis mentioned by Adrian and Shin (2009) and empirically 
evidenced by (Duca 2016; Malatesta et al., 2016; Hodula et al., 2017).
Furthermore, we will follow the approach by Barbu et al. (2016) and include the 
monetary aggregate M2 in GDP, expecting a negative relationship. This expectation 
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comes from the mere composition of M2, which includes the currency in circulation 
and deposits of all maturities. Namely, if we have a decreasing trend of deposit 
interest rates, economic agents will be looking to save or invest at higher yields and 
will tend to shift to other types of financial investments. Furthermore, if bank deposits 
decrease, this will impact their ability to offer loans. This will lead to a decrease in the 
money supply through the traditional banking channel, which will be supplemented 
(substituted) by an increase in the volume of activity of shadow banking.
We include the three-month inter-bank rate in the model in order to capture changes 
in the monetary policy settings. Regarding this determinant, we may generally 
assume that it has a negative impact on shadow banking growth, since the lower 
yields associated with lower market interest rates motivate investors to search for 
attractive returns in riskier places (the search for yield hypothesis). Yet, there are 
also studies that document a positive relationship (Den Haan and Sterk, 2011; 
Loutskina, 2011; Nelson et al., 2017). More specifically, Nelson et al. (2017) 
elaborate a “waterbed effect” of the monetary policy, i.e. the view that credit 
extension by banks and non-banks tends to respond in the opposite direction to 
monetary shocks. Banks can circumvent the increased funding costs by increasing 
their securitization activity, which leads to a migration of lending beyond the 
traditional banking system. Bearing this in mind, we expected the impact of this 
determinant to be ambiguous.
In order to capture any potentially complementary properties of shadow banking 
vis-à-vis traditional banking, we follow Kim (2016) and include growth of 
banking sector assets as a percent of GDP. According to Hodula (2018), there is 
some evidence that not only banks frequently sponsor shadow banking activities, 
often through financial vehicle corporations, but also traditional banks might be 
involved in investment funds. In other words, banks originate loans and sell them to 
brokers and dealers, and hedge funds. The buyers pool and securitize them and then 
distribute them to investors with different risk appetites, including hedge funds, 
asset managers, and insurance companies. Pozsar (2008) and Pozsar et al. (2010) 
illustrate this Originate-to-Distribute model in more detail. Subsequently, we expect 
a positive association between this determinant and shadow banking.
In our model, we also include variables representing other segments of the 
financial systems in the countries under investigation: the data on asset size of 
banks calculated as a percent of GDP; insurance penetration levels; and pension 
funds as a percent of GDP. We include these determinant, in order to capture 
complementarities with SBS and demand-side effects. Given the empirical findings 
by IMF (2014), Malatesta et al. (2016), we expect these variables to be positively 
associated with the growth of the shadow banking sector.
In addition to these determinants, we will include one dummy variable in the 
empirical model. We will use a binary dummy for the occurrence of a financial 
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crisis to mark the Global Financial Crisis as taking the value of one for the period 
from 2007 to 2008 and zero for all other periods. The periods of financial crises 
were selected based on the new European financial crises database (ESRB, 2017).
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics for the determinants involved in the 
regression model. According to Table 1, there were missing data observations 
for nearly all determinants. Moreover, there are significant differences among the 
countries in all selected variables. An example of this heterogeneity is OFI (Other 
Financial Intermediaries, expressed in percent of GDP) with a minimum of -39.1% 
and a maximum of 445.6%. This is also valid for other variables, such as the GDP 
growth and the short-term interest rate.
Table 1: Descriptive statistics
OFI GDPG MONEY SHORT BANKGDP PENETRA PENS
Mean 24.72 3.25 51.20 5.02 55.96 2.81 6.06
Median 11.20 3.60 51.95 3.33 56.91 2.70 4.76
Maximum 445.60 11.89 84.84 74.21 105.1 6.00 27.40
Minimum -39.10 -14.81 19.81 -0.33 10.9 0.71 0.02
Std. Dev. 55.76 3.99 15.40 7.83 20.59 1.11 5.21
Number of 
observations 215 220 162 196 202 213 185
Source: Authors’ calculations
Furthermore, we will analyze multi-collinearity among selected determinants. 
According to Gujarati and Porter (2009), multi-collinearity is a problem when the 
correlation is above 0.80. As we presented in Table 2, all correlation coefficients 
were found to be below this threshold, suggesting the continuation of use of all the 
variables included in running the regression model. 
Table 2: Correlation matrix
 OFI GDPG MONEY SHORT BANKGDP PENETRA PENS
OFI 1       
GDPG 0.3627 1      
MONEY -0.1858 0.3691 1     
SHORT 0.1961 0.1003 -0.4904 1    
BANKGDP 0.2721 0.5112 0.6344 -0.2439 1   
PENETRA 0.0025 0.0584 0.3643 -0.0218 0.0888 1  
PENS 0.1934 0.3767 0.5451 -0.2240 0.6307 0.2151 1
Source: Authors’ calculations
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In the next stage, Table 3 depicts the empirical results of thestatic fixed-effects 
model, and the difference- and system-GMM models. Despite the methodological 
differences, all approaches arrive at essentially similar results as to the sign and the 
statistical significance of most variables in the regression specification. 
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Number of countries 11 11 11
Hausman test 0.367
Sargan test (p-value) 
H0: The instruments are valid
0.665 0.345
Arellano-Bond test [AR (1)] 0.007 0.004
Arellano-Bond test [AR (2)] 0.665 0.693
Notes: Standard errors are presented in parentheses. 
Source: Authors’ calculations
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This confirms that our results are robust to different specifications, although the 
precision of the coefficients estimated differs across different methods used in our 
study. From a diagnostics perspective, the Sargan test shows that the instruments 
selected are valid (with a p-value of 0.67 for the difference GMM, and 0.35 for the 
system GMM model). The estimator ensures efficiency and consistency provided that 
the residuals do not show serial correlation of second order (even though the equations 
indicate that negative first order autocorrelation is present, this does not imply that 
the estimates are inconsistent). Inconsistency would be implied if second-order 
autocorrelation was present (Arellano and Bond, 1991), but this case was rejected 
by the test for AR(2) errors. As Roodman (2009: 128) highlights, dynamic panel 
estimators are more appropriate for “small T, large N” panels. Given that the number 
of countries (N) in our sample is small, the dynamic panel bias becomes insignificant, 
and a more straightforward fixed-effects estimator could be more appropriate.
The lagged dependent variable is statistically significant and has apositive value in 
the difference and system GMM models, confirming the dynamic character of the 
models and the persistence of shadow banking system growth. 
Among the macroeconomic determinants, we found evidence that the gross 
domestic product has a significant and positive impact on shadow banking growth 
in all three models. This relationship emphasizes that higher GDP might lead to an 
important rise in OFIs. The positive signs are in line with the literature. Namely, 
according to Ghosh et al. (2012), shadow banking in the sector in the CEE countries 
(where our 11 NMS also belong), due to its particular structure (consisting mainly 
of cooperative banks, credit unions, leasing and factoring companies, microfinance 
companies), is that of providing alternative funding to the economy.
Furthermore, regarding the influence of monetary policy, we report mixed and 
mostly statistically insignificant results across different model specifications, 
ranging from positive to negative. Thus, the M2/GDP ratio results show that this 
determinant has a significant and negative impact on shadow banking growth, 
but only in the fixed model. The results indicate that, in times of shadow banking 
expansion, financing through the traditional banking channel decreases, as banks 
are restricted to create money. When deposit interest rates follow a decreasing 
trend, economic agents are looking to save or invest at higher yields and tend to 
shift to other types of financial investments, which the mainstream banking might 
not provide. Thus, the financial resources collected by banks by means of deposits 
record a decrease, which further impacts their ability to grant loans. Consequently, 
the financing of the real economy through bank loans compresses and the money 
supply through the traditional banking channel decreases, being supplemented by 
an increase in shadow banking volume of activity (similar to Barbu et al., 2016).
The positive effect of short-term interest rates emphasized in the literature is 
confirmed by the results of this study in all three models, also showing support of 
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the “waterbed” hypothesis of monetary policy for the NMS. The results suggest 
that tightening the monetary policy might increase the growth of OFIs, implying 
that a higher cost of funding increases traditional banks’ incentives to engage in 
securitization, carried out and operationalized by OFIs. Our results are consistent 
with the findings of Den Haan and Sterk (2011), Loutskina (2011) and Nelson et al. 
(2017). 
The results of the coefficients who associated with the banking sector show that 
this determinant has strong positive effect on shadow banking supporting the view 
that shadow banking can progress alongside traditional banking. This results that 
is accompanied with the growth of the traditional bank as Originate-to-Distribute 
model implies and the existence of some common roots of both processes (the 
European integration development of ITC technologies, financial innovation).
The results from the financial sectors (insurance and pension funds) are in line 
with the literature (Lemma, 2016; Kim, 2016; and Hodula, 2018). The empirical 
results show that these determinants are statistically significant in almost all models 
and that shadow banking is complementary not only to the banking sector, but 
to the rest of the financial system as well. Namely, insurance companies provide 
protection against financial loss and subscribe collateralized debt obligations to 
invest their cash. On the other hand, pension funds invest in securities issued in 
the shadow credit intermediation process, such as asset-backed commercial papers, 
asset-backed securities, and collateralized debt obligations (Hodula, 2018).
As for the dummy variable, which was introduced to cover the global economic 
crisis, we found that crisis dummy variable was statistically significant at the 1% 
level of significance, in all three models. This is likely because banks reduced their 
activities (primarily lending) during the crisis, while at the same time this meant 
expansion of OFI products. The results are in line with those of Hodula (2018), but 
different from those of Apostoaie and Bilan (2019).
5. Results and discussions
The results presented in Table 3 confirm that macroeconomic and financial factors 
play a role in affecting the shadow banking growth. The impact of financial 
factors is statistically significant and more consistent across the different empirical 
specifications. Moreover, these results indicate complementarity between the 
development of shadow banking and therest of the financial system as well. In 
these economies, shadowbanks provide alternative funding where traditional 
banking is not able to do soespecially the complementarity could be viewed in the 
perspective of mortgage financing. Namely where regulatory constrains do not 
permit traditional banks to provide mortgage on the full property value, shadow 
banks might step in to offer a way to finance the rest of the borrower’s claims. 
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Furthermore, the results indicate that the shadow banking system is highly 
procyclical, owing to the identified positive relationship with real GDP growth. 
This finding should be viewed in the light of bank regulation, where especially 
Basel III norms made an effort to reduce bank lending procyclicality. In some 
countries, shadow loans may turn out to undermine the effectiveness of capital-
based regulations (such as the counter-cyclical capital buffer) or the introduction of 
loan-to-value limits. 
Such results were opening new issues for macroprudential policy, for the current 
policy debate and for financial stability. This results pointing the need of consider 
risk factors in analyzing monetary policy effectiveness. Pass -through strength of 
monetary policy rates through the non-bank financial sector and the banking sector 
is affected by the resilience of the financial sector. Also this results may consider 
bearing in mind the Basel III norms, bearing in mind that one of the main goal of 
Basel III is to reduce procyclicality of bank lending, and the rise of shadow banking 
may have impact of both capital-based regulation and income-based limits
6. Conclusion
Based on the results presented, the hypothesis that selected macroeconomic and 
financial variables have statistically significant impact on shadow banking growth 
could be confirmed. The empirical findings of this study show that the shadow 
banking sector (in terms of total assets of other financial intermediaries as a percent 
of GDP) has been positively influenced by, among other things, the developments in 
the financial insurance and pension sectors, banking sector, money market rates, as 
well as by the general economic growth. We also found that global financial crisis 
in 2007-2008 has a negative impact on the shadow banking growth. On the other 
hand, there is a limited evidence that the impact of money supply (M2/GDP ratio) 
on shadow banking growth is negative, because that result is relevant only in the 
fixed model. This study complements the existent economic literature by analyzing 
the determinants of shadow banking growth in the 11 new EU member states. To 
the best of the authors’ knowledge, this is only the second study analyzing the new 
EU member states.
This study does not face significant limitations, but their removal will certainly 
contribute to more robust results. Firstly, there are some missing data observations 
forthe selected determinants over a longer period. The existence of long time series 
of data would allow for obtaining more accurate and more reliable results. Secondly, 
the selected variables fail to catch the effects of regulatory arbitrage opportunities 
on the development of bank-like activities outside the regulated banking system.
The future avenues of conducting research on the phenomenon of shadow banking 
should be focused on investigating the impact of other potentially relevant 
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determinants, such as the effective reserve requirements ratio, the long-term interest 
rate, and the inflation rate. Furthermore, if data on narrowly defined shadow 
banking (in accordance with the Financial Stability Board’s methodology) emerge 
for a longer time span, it is believed that additional analysis on the determinants of 
shadow banking can be conducted from various perspectives. As data accumulates 
over time, researchers can also apply the method of two- or three-least squares or 
panel co-integration models. Additional research is needed to estimate not only 
the size and determinants of the shadow banking system, but also its complexity, 
interconnectedness, and risk of contagion of the other segments of the financial 
system.
References
Adrian, T. (2014) Financial stability policies for shadow banking, FRBNY Staff 
Reports, Vol. 66, No. 4, New York: Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
Adrian, T., Shin, H. S. (2009) “The Shadow Banking System: Implications for 
Financial Regulation Financial Stability Review, issue 13, pp. 1–10, https://
EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bfr:fisrev:2009:13:1.
Agresti, A., Brence, R. (2017) “Statistical work on shadow banking: development 
of new datasets and indicators for shadow banking”, Irving Fisher Committtee-
National Bank of Belgium Workshop on Data needs and Statistics compilation 
for macroprudential analysis, Brussels, Belgium, 18-19 May 2017, https://
www.bis.org/ifc/publ/ifcb46p.pdf.
Arellano, M., Bond, S. (1991) “Some tests of specification for panel data. Monte 
Carlo evidence and an application to employment equations”, The Review of 
Economic Studies, Vol. 58, Issue 2, pp. 277–297, https://doi.org/10.2307/2297968.
Arellano, M., and Bover, O. (1995) “Another Look at the Instrumental Variables 
Estimation of Error-Component Models”, Journal of Econometrics, No. 68, pp. 
29–51, https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/030440769401642D.
Bakk-Simon, et al. (2012) “Shadow banking in the euro area: An overview”, ECB 
Occasional Paper Series, No. 133, pp. 1–33, https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/
pdf/scpops/ecbocp133.pdf.
Barbu, T. C., Boitan, I. A., Cioaca, S. I. (2016) “Macroeconomic determinants of 
shadow banking—Evidence from EU countries”, Review of Economic and 
Business Studies, Vol. 9, No. 2, doi: https://doi.org/10.1515/rebs-2016-0037.
Blundell, R., Bond, S. (1998) “Initial Conditions and Moment Restrictions in 
Dynamic Panel Data Models”, Journal of Econometrics, Vol. 87, No. 1, pp. 
115–143, https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:econom:v:87:y:1998:i:1.
Beck, G. W., Kotz, H.-H. (2016) “Les activities de shadow banking dans un 
contexte de bas taux d’interet: une perspective de flux financiers. ”Revue 
d’economie financiere, Vol. 121, No. 1, pp. 235–256.
Jordan Kjosevski, Mihail Petkovski, Aleksandar Stojkov • The impact of macroeconomic... 
Zb. rad. Ekon. fak. Rij. • 2020 • vol. 38 • no. 2 • 407-427 423
Bryan, N., Sengupta, R. (2011)“Is Shadow Banking Really Banking?” The Regional 
Economist, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, pp. 8–13, https://www.
stlouisfed.org/~/media/Files/PDFs/publications/pub_assets/pdf/re/2011/d/ 
shadow banking.pdf. 
Claessens, S., Ratnovski, (2014) “What Is Shadow Banking?”, IMF Working Paper, 
WP/14/25, https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2014/wp1425.pdf.
Constantin-Marius, A., Bilan, I. (2019) “Macro determinants of shadow banking in 
Central and Eastern European countries”, Economic Research-Ekonomska 
Istraživanja, Vol. 32, https://doi.org/10.1080/1331677X.2019.1633943.
Du, J., Li, C., Wang, Y. (2017) “A comparative study of shadow banking activities 
of nonfinancial firms in transition economies”, China Economic Review, Vol. 
46, pp. S35–S49, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.chieco.2016.09.001.
Duca, J. V. (2016) “How Capital Regulation and Other Factors Drive the Role of 
Shadow Banking in Funding Short-Term Business Credit”, Journal of Banking 
& Finance, Vol. 69, pp. 10–24, doi: 10.1016/j.jbankfin.2015.06.016.
EC. (2012) Green paper on shadow banking, http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/
bank/docs/shadow/green-paper_en.pdf.
ESRB (2017) “EU Shadow Banking Monitor 2017”, European Systemic Risk 
Board: Frankfurt.
Den Haan, W. J., Sterk, V. (2011) “The Myth of Financial Innovation and the Great 
Moderation”, The Economic Journal, Vol. 121, No. 553, pp. 707–739.
Dumičić, M., and Ridzak. T. (2016) “Are Shadow Banks Hiding in Croatia as 
Well?”, Surveys S-20, Croatian National Bank, Zagreb.
FSB. (2011) “Shadow Banking: Strengthening Oversight and Regulation”, 
Recommendations of the Financial Stability Board.
FSB. (2014) Global Shadow Banking Monitoring Report 2014, Retrieved from 
http://www.fsb.org/wp-content/uploads/r_141030.pdf.
FSB. (2015) Global Shadow Banking Monitoring Report 2015, www.fsb.org/wp-
content/ uploads/global-shadow-banking-monitoring-report-2015.pdf.
FSB. (2019) Global Monitoring Report on Non-Bank Financial Intermediation 
2019, https://www.fsb.org/2020/01/global-monitoring-report-on-non-bank-
financial-intermediation-2019/.
Ghosh, S., Gonzalez del Mazo, I., Otker-Robe, I. (2012) “Chasing the Shadows: 
How Significant Is Shadow Banking in Emerging Markets?”, Economic 
Premise, No. 88, https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986
/17088/724450BRI0EP880OWLEDGE0NOTES0SERIES.pdf?sequence= 
1&isAllowed=y.
Global Monitoring Report on Non-Bank Financial Intermediation 2018 4 February 
2019, https://www.fsb.org/wp-content/uploads/P040219.pdf.
Jordan Kjosevski, Mihail Petkovski, Aleksandar Stojkov • The impact of macroeconomic... 
424 Zb. rad. Ekon. fak. Rij. • 2020 • vol. 38 • no. 2 • 407-427
Giron, C., Matas-Mir, A. (2017) “Interconnectedness of shadow banks in the euro 
area”, Vol. 46, Bank for International Settlements Basel, Switzerland, https://
www.bis.org/ifc/publ/ifcb46r.pdf.
Girasa, R. (2016) Shadow banking. The rise, risks, and rewards of non-bank 
financial services, New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
Grillet-Aubert et al. Assessing shadow banking – non-bank financial intermediation 
in Europe No. 10, https://www.esrb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/occasional/20160727_
occasional_paper_10.en.pdf.
Gorton, G., Metrick, A. (2012) “Securitized Banking and the Run on Repo,” Journal 
of Financial Economics, Vol. 104, No. 3, pp. 425–51, http://www.sciencedirect.
com/science/article/pii/S0304405X1100081X.
Hausman, J. A. (1978) “Specification Tests in Econometrics”, Econometrica, Vol. 
46, No. 6, pp. 1251–1271, http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0012-9682%281978 
O%3B2-X&origin=repec.
Hodula, M., Machacek, M., Melecky, A. (2017) “Macroeconomic determinants of 
shadow banking: Evidence from Spain” In J. Proceedings of the 14th 
International Scientific Conference, Vol. 1, pp. 204–212, Brno: Masaryk 
University. https://obd.vsb.cz/fcgi/verso.fpl/fname/obd_public_det/id/286098669.
Hodula, M. (2018) “Off the Radar: Exploring the Rise of Shadow Banking in the 
EU”, The Working Paper Series of the Czech National Bank (CNB) https://
www.cnb.cz/export/sites/cnb/en/economicresearch/.galleries/research_
publications/cnb_wp/cnbwp_2018_16.pdf.
Hodula, M. (2019) “Monetary Policy and Shadow Banking: Trapped between a 
Rock and a Hard Place”, Working Papers 2019/5, Czech National Bankhttps://
www.cnb.cz/export/sites/cnb/en/economiresearch/.galleries/research_
publications/cnb_wp/cnbwp_2019_05.pdf.
Hodula, M., Macháček, M., Meleck, A. (2020) “Placing the Czech Shadow Banking 
Sector under the Light”, Prague Economic Papers Vol. 29 No. 1, pp. 3–28, doi: 
10.18267/j.pep.710.
Hsiao, C. (1986) “Analysis of Panel Data. Econometric Society Monographs”, No. 
11, New York: Cambridge University Press.
IMF. (2014) “Shadow Banking around the Globe: How Large, and How Risky? In 
Global financial stability report. Risk taking, liquidity, and shadow banking. 
Curbing excess while promoting growth”, International Monetary Fund, 
Washington, DC, pp. 65–104, https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/GFSR/
Issues/2016/12/31/Risk-Taking-Liquidity-and-Shadow-Banking-Curbing-
Excess-While-Promoting-Growth.
Judson, R. A., Owen, L. A. (1999) “Estimating Dynamic Panel Data Models: A 
Guide for Macroeconomists”, Economics Letters, Vol. 65, pp. 9–15, https://
faculty.smu.edu/millimet/classes/eco6375/papers/judson%20owen%201999.
pdf.
Jordan Kjosevski, Mihail Petkovski, Aleksandar Stojkov • The impact of macroeconomic... 
Zb. rad. Ekon. fak. Rij. • 2020 • vol. 38 • no. 2 • 407-427 425
Jeffers, E., Plihon, D. (2016) “What is so special about European Shadow banking? 
FEPS Studies, Vol. 26.
Kim, S (2016) “What drives shadow banking? A dynamic panel evidence Eighth 
IFC Conference on Statistical implications of the new financial landscape” 
Basel, 8–9 September 2016.
Langfield, S., Pagano, M. (2016) “Bank bias in Europe: Effects on systemic risk 
and growth”, Economic Policy, Vol. 31, No. 85, pp. 51–106, doi: 10.1093/
epolic/eiv019.
Lambin, J. (2014) “Rethinking the Market Economy: New Challenges, New Ideas, 
New Opportunities”, Palgrave Macmillan.
Lysandrou, P., Nesvetailova, A. (2015) “The role of shadow banking entities in the 
financial crisis: A disaggregated view”, Review of International Political 
Economy, Vol. 22, No. 2, pp. 257–279, doi:10.1080/09692290.2014.896269.
Loutskina, E. (2011) “The Role of Securitization in Bank Liquidity and Funding 
Management”, Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 100, No. 3, pp. 663–684. 
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0304-405X(11)00038-9.
Malatesta, F., Masciantonio, S., Zaghini, A. (2016) “The shadow banking system in 
the Euro area: Definitions, key features and the funding of firms”, Italian 
Economic Journal, Vol. 2, No. 2, pp. 217–237, https://link.springer.com/
article/10.1007/s40797-016-0032-0.
Maddaloni, A. and Peydró, J.-L. (2011) “Bank risk-taking, securitization, 
supervision and low interest rates: evidence from the euro area and the US 
lending standards”, Review of Financial Studies, Vol. 24, pp. 2121–2165.
Mehrling et al. (2013) “Bagehot was a Shadow Banker: Shadow Banking, Central 
Banking, and the Future of Global Finance”, SSRN Electronic Journal, doi: 
10.2139/ssrn.2232016.
Nelson, B., G. Pinter., Theodoridis, K. (2018) “Do Contractionary Monetary Policy 
Shocks Expand Shadow Banking?”, Journal of Applied Econometrics, Vol. 33, 
pp. 198–211, https://doi.org/10.1002/jae.2594 
Nesvetailova, A. (2018) Shadow Banking: Scope, Origins and Theories (Routledge 
Critical Studies in Finance and Stability) 1st Edition.
Nickell, S. (1981) “Biases in Dynamic Models with Fixed Effects”, Econometrica, 
Vol. 49, No. 6, pp. 1417–1426, https://doi.org/10.2307/1911408.
O’Sullivan, V., Kinsella, S. (2012) Chasing shadows: Europe prepares to regulate 
shadow banking Journal of Banking Regulation,Vol. 13, pp. 173–177, https://
link.springer.com/article/10.1057%2Fjbr.2012.8.
Petkovski, M., Kjosevski, J., Jovanovski, K. (2018) “Empirical Panel Analysis of 
Non-Performing Loans in the Czech Republic. What are their Determinants and 
How Strong is Their Impact on the Real Economy?”, Finance a úvěr-Czech 
Journal of Economics and Finance, Vol. 68, No. 5, http://journal.fsv.cuni.cz/
storage/1420_460_490_kjosevski_final_issue_05_2018.pdf. 
Jordan Kjosevski, Mihail Petkovski, Aleksandar Stojkov • The impact of macroeconomic... 
426 Zb. rad. Ekon. fak. Rij. • 2020 • vol. 38 • no. 2 • 407-427
Portes, R. (2018) “Interconnectedness: Mapping the shadow banking system”, 
Banque de France European Stability Review, pp. 2–10, https://repositori.upf.edu/
bitstream/handle/10230/35505/Ademu-WP-1172018%20Interconnectedness.
pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y.
Pozsar, Z. (2008) “The rise and fall of the shadow banking system”, Regional 
Financial Review, pp. 13–25, https://www.economy.com/sbs.
Pozsar, Z. et al. (2010) “Shadow banking”, Federal Reserve Bank of New York 
Staff Report, No. 458, https://www.newyorkfed.org/medialibrary/media/
research/staff_reports/sr458.pdf.
Rinaldi L., Sanchis-Arellano, A. (2006) “Household Debt Sustainability, what 
Explains Household Non-Performing Loans?”, An Empirical Analysis, Working 
Paper Series, No. 570, European Central Bank https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/
pdf/scpwps/ecbwp570.pdf.
Roodman, D. (2009) “How to do xtabond2: An introduction to difference and 
system GMM in Stata”, The Stata Journal, Vol. 9, No. 1, pp. 86–136, https://
doi.org/10.1177/1536867X0900900106.
Svirydzenka, K. (2016) “Introducing a New Broad-Based Index of Financial 
Development”, IMF Working Paper 16/5, https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/
WP/Issues/2016/12/31.
Wesley C.M. (2014) “Inside shadow banking: understanding the doomsday 
machine”, European Journal of Economics and Economic Policies Intervention, 
Vol. 11, No. 3, pp. 315–332, doi: 10.4337/ejeep.2014.03.06.
Jordan Kjosevski, Mihail Petkovski, Aleksandar Stojkov • The impact of macroeconomic... 
Zb. rad. Ekon. fak. Rij. • 2020 • vol. 38 • no. 2 • 407-427 427
Utjecaj makroekonomskih i financijskih čimbenika na bankarstvo  
u sjeni u novim državama članicama EU-a
Kjosevski Jordan1, Mihail Petkovski2, Aleksandar Stojkov3
Sažetak
Cilj ovog rada je ispitati kako različite varijable iz makroekonomskog i 
financijskog okruženja utječu na dinamiku bankarskog sektora u sjeni u odabranih 
11 novih država članica EU-a koristeći godišnje podatke za razdoblje 1999-2018. 
Primjenjuju se tri alternativne tehnike procjene: model s fiksnim efektima, metoda 
procjene GMM razlika i GMM sustava. Empirijski rezultati dokazuju da su 
najvažniji čimbenici razvoja u financijskom sektoru (sektoru osiguranja i 
mirovinskom sektoru), bankarskom sektoru, te stopi na tržištu novca kao i opći 
ekonomski rast. Također je utvrđeno da globalna financijska kriza negativno utječe 
na rast bankarstva u sjeni. Dobiveni rezultati ukazuju na to da je bankarski sustav 
u sjeni komplementaran, ne samo tradicionalnim bankama, već i ostatku 
financijskog sustava, te otvara nova pitanja makrobonitetne politike imajući u vidu 
Basel III norme. Naime, jedan od glavnih ciljeva Basela III je smanjiti 
procikličnost bankarskog kreditiranja, a porast bankarstva u sjeni može utjecati 
kako na regulaciju koja se temelji na kapitalu tako i na ograničenja temeljena na 
dohotku. 
Ključne riječi: bankarstvo u sjeni, nove države članice EU-a, panel analiza podataka
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